75
        
        
          
            27.
          
        
        
          Holstein, Ulrich: op. cit., Nærum 1979, p. 33.
        
        
          
            28.
          
        
        
          Andersen, Jens: op. cot., Hanstholm 2007, p. 224.
        
        
          
            29.
          
        
        
          Ibid, p. 157.
        
        
          
            30.
          
        
        
          Eisenhower, Dwight D.:
        
        
          
            Korstog i Europa
          
        
        
          , 1948, p. 46.
        
        
          
            31.
          
        
        
          Ibid, p. 48.
        
        
          
            32.
          
        
        
          Sørensen, Jakob: op. cit., Kbh. 2004, p. 38.
        
        
          
            33.
          
        
        
          Trommer, Aage: op. cit., Kbh. 1982, p. 181.
        
        
          
            34.
          
        
        
          Bonvig Christensen, Arne: op. cit., Odense 1976, p. 70ff.
        
        
          
            35.
          
        
        
          Eisenhower, Dwight D.: op. cit., 1948
        
        
          
            36.
          
        
        
          Sørensen, Jakob: op. cit., Kbh. 2004, p. 39.
        
        
          
            37.
          
        
        
          Bonvig Christensen, Arne: op. cit., Odense 1976, p. 111.
        
        
          
            38.
          
        
        
          Sørensen, Jakob: op. cit., Kbh. 2004, p. 24.
        
        
          
            39.
          
        
        
          Fahrendorf, Jakob: op. cit., 1994, p. 46.
        
        
          
            40.
          
        
        
          Sørensen, Jakob: op. cit., Kbh. 2004, p. 86.
        
        
          
            41.
          
        
        
          Bonvig Christensen, Arne: op. cit., Odense 1976, p. 72.
        
        
          
            42.
          
        
        
          Eisenhower, Dwight D.: op. cit., 1948, p. 195.
        
        
          
            43.
          
        
        
          Trommer, Aage: op. cit., Kbh. 1982, p. 181.
        
        
          
            Summary
          
        
        
          Esbjerg was a designated support point in the German At-
        
        
          lantic Wall during the Second World War. The area was
        
        
          consequently fortified to a degree which exceeded that of
        
        
          Normandy, where the Allied invasion landed on 6 June
        
        
          1944. This raises the question of what threat the Germans
        
        
          perceived as justification for the massive construction of the
        
        
          defence along the west coast of Jutland and around Esbjerg.
        
        
          All analyses indicate that Esbjerg – primarily because of
        
        
          its harbour – had the potential to be a target for attack, but
        
        
          that a number of factors were pulling in the opposite direc-
        
        
          tion. The narrow approach and the nature of the coast along
        
        
          the west coast of Jutland made the area a difficult place to
        
        
          invade. Denmark was also much too far away from England
        
        
          for the Allies to be provided with adequate air support in the
        
        
          event of an invasion. But despite these circumstances, the
        
        
          Germans strengthened and extended their coastal defences
        
        
          in Denmark throughout the war.
        
        
          There were several reasons for the extensive fortifica-
        
        
          tions not only in Denmark, but along the entire 5,000 kilo-
        
        
          metres or so of coastline in the Atlantic Wall. Firstly, the
        
        
          Germans were under pressure in the war and they anticipated
        
        
          the invasion, which could only be stemmed by a strong and
        
        
          effective coastal defence. The German general Erwin Rom-
        
        
          mel in particular was an advocate of this. Until the end of
        
        
          1943, the Germans had practised a strategy based on mobile
        
        
          fighting units which could be moved to an invasion area.
        
        
          Rommel succeeded in persuading Hitler to commence con-
        
        
          struction of the enormous fortifications along the Atlantic
        
        
          Wall which are still evident in many places around Esbjerg
        
        
          and along the west coast of Jutland. Secondly, the extent of
        
        
          the German defensive constructions was an expression of a
        
        
          successful bluff on the part of the Allies.
        
        
          Even though the Germans were convinced that the Al-
        
        
          lied invasion would land in France, their attention remained
        
        
          fixed on Denmark and the rest of the Atlantic line. One of
        
        
          the reasons for this was that the Germans feared Allied com-
        
        
          mando raids or a flank attack which could destabilise the
        
        
          German defences. The Germans were also convinced that
        
        
          they had to expect the unexpected – including an invasion
        
        
          in areas which may not have been so obvious. An explana-
        
        
          tion of the uncertainty which this reflects is that during most
        
        
          of the Second World War, the Germans lacked an effective
        
        
          intelligence service which could have intercepted the Allies’
        
        
          invasion plans. As early as the end of 1941, there were strong
        
        
          indications that all German agents in Great Britain had been
        
        
          apprehended and, in some cases, switched to the allied side
        
        
          to give false intelligence to the German supreme command.
        
        
          The fact that this mission succeeded became clear during the
        
        
          invasion in Normandy, which clearly caught the Germans
        
        
          by surprise as they expected the invasion in the area around
        
        
          Calais at the English Channel. The Germans were thus not
        
        
          in a position to predict where the invasion would land. In
        
        
          this situation they dared not do otherwise than establish and
        
        
          maintain a strong coastal defence all along the Atlantic Wall
        
        
          – especially around potential invasion harbours. Although
        
        
          the Allies never entertained serious thoughts of an invasion
        
        
          on the west coast of Jutland, the uncertainty on the part of
        
        
          the Germans was the reason why the area around Esbjerg at-
        
        
          tracted so much attention from the German forces during the
        
        
          Second World War and was fortified to a degree where there
        
        
          are still clear reminders in the city and the surrounding area.